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INTRODUCTION
As the end of the TWentieth Century approaches, the law of regu-
1 latory takings is in an era of flux and rapid development. Fueled
by the collision between development and environmental protection/
land-use regulations, the battle lines have been drawn over the extent
to which private property rights can be limited or destroyed by gov-
ernment in the name of the common good, without payment of com-
pensation. The battle being waged now in courts and legislatures
across the country was anticipated almost seventy-five years ago, in
the seminal regulatory takings case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,' in which Justice Holmes opined that the power of govern-
ment to destroy private property rights via regulation is not unlimited
and that "the police power can be stretched so far."2
Despite the plethora of regulatory takings cases since Pennsylvania
Coal, the question of how far is "too far" has not been answered. In-
deed, the much-heralded decision of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council' has failed to provide a meaningful answer for the typical con-
troversy involving governmental land-use regulations. Although Lu-
cas makes clear that, absent a nuisance, a taking under the Fifth
Amendment occurs when a governmental regulation deprives an
owner of all economically viable use of property, little guidance is pro-
vided for the far more common scenario-when less than 100% of
value is destroyed.4 Indeed, we are left with Justice Scalia's somewhat
whimsical remarks:
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1. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
2. Id at 413.
3. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
4. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part that
"private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. This protection of the Fifth Amendment is extended to the
states through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 141 n.3 (1978). Moreover, most state constitutions
have identical or similar "takings" provisions. For example, see Kirk v. Denver Pub-
lishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 271 (Colo. 1991) (statute violated takings clause of state and
federal constitutions), Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 380 A.2d 216, 220 (Md. 1977) (tak-
ings clause of state constitution applied to zoning case). See also William A. Fischel,
Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Prop-
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It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will
get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full.
But that occasional result is no more strange than the gross disparity
between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway
(who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property is reduced
to 5% of its former value by the highway (who recovers nothing).
Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing" situations.5
While takings law may be full of these "all-or-nothing" situations, one
must consider, as did the sometimes whimsical Oscar Hammerstein,
that " '[A]I1 or nothing' situations seldom are what they appear to
be."'6 Certainly, property owners and governments remain uncertain
as to how to apply government regulations of property that fall in be-
tween "all" or "nothing." The lack of clarity in this area is particularly
troublesome as governments continue to enact and apply environmen-
tal and land-use regulations in recognition of the fact that we live on a
small and fragile planet.7
Today, prudent land-use restrictions, such as the prohibition of con-
struction on "steep slopes"8 or the filling of valuable "wetlands," 9 are
as commonplace as conventional zoning or the restrictions on subsur-
face coal mining in Pennsylvania.". Indeed, some developers view
these regulations as contributing to the value of property because they
prevent overdevelopment of property, destruction of the environ-
ment, and other undesirable activities, thereby tending to increase the
erty?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 888 (1991) ("at least half of the state constitutions
strengthened the language of their takings clauses in the late nineteenth century");
Jan G. Laitos, The Takings Clause In America's Industrial States After Lucas, 24 U.
TOL. L. REV. 281, 281 n.3 (1993) (citing MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2: "Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made
or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in pro-
ceedings in a court of record").
5. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
6. The paraphrase is taken from the song I Cain't Say No from the musical com-
edy OKLAHOMA!, Act I, music by Richard Rodgers, lyrics by Oscar Hammerstein II
(New York: Williamson Music, Inc., 1943).
7. The power of government to adopt regulations that destroy all or virtually all
of the value of property for the purpose of eliminating or preventing a nuisance has
been upheld against a takings claim. See Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). However, the so-called "Mugler" nuisance
exception was read narrowly in Lucas, in which Mugler was held to authorize only
governmental prohibition of uses that were never part of the property owner's title to
begin with. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. But see M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47
F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a federal statute can establish the
uses that are permitted at the time the property owner took title).
8. See, e.g., Carole Gilbert Brown, High-Rise For Senior Citizens on Back Burner,
Church Says, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETTE, Apr. 20, 1994 at S1 (referring to township
prohibition of construction on hillsides with 25% grade).
9. See, e.g., LeAnn Spencer & Matt O'Connor, Wetlands Suit Ends in $450,000
Fine, CHI. TRIn.,.June 8, 1994, at 1 (referring to marina accused of filling wetlands).
10. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987),
citing The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52, § 1406.1-1406.21 (1994).
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value of all of the property in the regulated area. In other words, if all
property owners must preserve wetlands and protect the environment,
the result is a more desirable community and higher property values
overall.1
Despite the overall effect of such regulations, individual property
owners may believe that they are uniquely or unfairly burdened.' 2
Thus, governmental bodies, especially smaller units of government,
such as villages and towns, are faced with continued threats that en-
actment and application of land-use and environmental regulations
will result in major litigation involving costs extending far beyond
what a modest community can readily afford.' 3 The threat to effective
land-use regulation may not be so much in the actual award but in the
threat posed by costly litigation and the possibility of such an award.' 4
Although the regulatory takings doctrine is an important safeguard
against oppressive land-use legislation, the government's power to en-
act necessary limitations on the use of private property cannot be alto-
gether destroyed. Unfortunately, Lucas did not provide much
guidance for determining when government regulation goes "too far"
and becomes oppressive. Indeed, aside from the rhetorical force of
the Lucas categorical taking holding,'5 Justice Scalia's "all-or-noth-
ing" analogy is of little assistance in resolving everyday land-use
disputes.
Although Lucas holds that the "all" scenario occurs when all eco-
nomically viable use of the property is destroyed,' 6 the Court does not
address whether a complete destruction of a portion of the property
causes a taking. For example, if government regulation prevents two
acres of a ten-acre parcel from being developed, it remains unclear
whether there has been a complete destruction of the right to develop
the two-acre portion, presumably a taking of the two acres, or a
twenty percent reduction in value of the ten acres, presumably not
causing a taking. Lucas also does not establish whether a taking is
caused by complete destruction of one strand of the property owner's
total bundle of property rights, such as his or her right to exclude
others from a portion of the property17 or change its use.'. If a taking
11. See Dan Gordon, The Environment vs. Property Rights; Want a Toxic Dump
Next Door?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at 25.
12. Id. ("the sheer act of paying property owners for their claims and the specter
of continued litigation would dramatically undermine our environmental and zoning
laws").
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2893 (1992) (describ-
ing categorical takings).
16. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
17. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (right to exclude
others from a portion of coastal property).
18. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989) (right to
change the use of one's property).
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occurs when one or a few strands of the bundle of property rights are
destroyed, then "all" no longer has the same meaning as it had in the
colloquy between Justices Scalia and Stevens.19
Whether loss of the "whole parcel" is necessary to trigger a taking is
the focus of Part I of this Article. The section examines the change
from the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Penn Central through Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent in 1981 in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diegoz° to the majority's decisions in 1987 in First English Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles,"' Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission22 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis.23
The principles set forth in the 1987 cases, however, cause further
confusion, as described in Part II of this Article, which focuses on val-
uation issues that occur when less than the whole parcel is "taken."
Although the phrase "all-or-nothing" was used in Lucas, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that destruction of less than all economically viable use
of the entire parcel could cause a regulatory taking under the Penn
Central balancing test. Penn Central requires a court to focus on the
economic impact of the regulation, the extent to which it interferes
with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action. 4 However, Penn Central provides little guidance
regarding how this test is to be applied or when a regulation goes "too
far" in light of the relevant factors. No significant additional guidance
is provided by Lucas, thus still leaving open the question of how much
diminution in value causes a taking when less than 100% of the prop-
erty's value has been destroyed.
Part II of this Article explores the conundrum of determining any
one property's loss in value arising from the application of a particular
regulation. Is value to be determined based upon the reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations for the property's development that its
owners had at the time they took title? Even so, can anyone, today,
have a reasonable expectation that property can be valued as if it were
free and clear of government regulations? Part II of this Article con-
siders the problem that, while some property owners' claims may be
disallowed because the regulatory scheme they challenge was already
in place when they took title to the property, in many instances regu-
lations are imposed after title has been vested but before development
was attempted. In such cases, Lucas leaves unanswered the question
of how fair market value should be calculated, particularly when the
property owner claims that fair market value should be based on a
19. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
20. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
21. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
22. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
23. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
REACH OF REGULATION
potential use of the property that was never in existence and for which
none of the requisite permits had been obtained.
Lucas leaves these questions unanswered because, in Lucas, the
Supreme Court found that all, not just a portion, of the economically
viable use of the property had been destroyed. Thus, the Supreme
Court had no occasion to integrate the Penn Central factors with the
oft-litigated methods of determining fair market value in eminent do-
main cases. As a result, practitioners must look to state and lower
federal court decisions for precedent concerning complex valuation
issues.
Part II of this Article considers some of these decisions. Given the
highly fact-specific setting in which most takings cases arise, the po-
tential range of valuation issues is practically limitless.25 Among the
many valuation issues that may arise is whether the economic return
from the "highest and best use"26 of property is inherently equivalent
to the owner's reasonable or distinct investment-backed expectations.
What if the property owner inherited, rather than purchased, the land
and had no present intention of using it for its highest and best use
until the government precluded the highest and best use by enacting
new regulations?
It has become apparent to practitioners forced to litigate these cases
that the principles guiding eminent domain valuations have an impor-
tant role to play in placing the Penn Central balancing test on a more
concrete footing. Part II of this Article identifies some of those con-
nections and, although not establishing the "holy grail" or a "bright
line" for takings cases, at least suggests how the lessons from the law
of eminent domain could be applied to make the Penn Central test
more predictable.
Part III of this Article focuses on the "fairness" balancing test uti-
lized by the courts to resolve cases in which less than all value of the
affected property has been destroyed. The fairness test requires a
court to determine whether a challenged regulation unfairly singles
out one or a few property owners and subjects them to grossly dispro-
portionate burdens, while conferring benefits on society generally.
Ultimately, this balancing test assumes great importance in the regula-
tory takings arena, especially when the economic evidence is
borderline.
25. Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (using
a flexible approach based on factual nuances).
26. The term "highest and best use" has a number of interpretations in divergent
cases. The Supreme Court has used the term in at least 12 cases beginning with Will-
ing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 285 (1928) ("highest and best use for
the property of the financial gain of the tenant . . .") to Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2908 (1992) (appraiser's value based on "highest and
best use of [plaintiff's] lots... [was] luxury single family detached dwellings") (Black-
mun, J. dissenting).
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Finally, as of this writing, Congress is considering legislation that
would require compensation in the event the application of govern-
ment wetland, endangered species, and certain other enumerated reg-
ulations cause property to lose in excess of twenty percent of its fair
market value.27 While such legislation would certainly establish the
bright line that has proven to be elusive in the caselaw, it is obvious
that a twenty percent diminution in value is such a low threshold that
virtually any significant application of the enumerated regulations to
property would trigger the right to compensation. By creating a right
to compensation for virtually every significant application of such reg-
ulations, the proposed, federal legislation would eliminate the takings
"problem" by making government regulation prohibitively expensive.
However, such legislation may not affect the vast majority of the
country's takings cases, since they arise due to the application of local
land-use and environmental laws or regulations. Thus, for the fore-
seeable future, practitioners will be called upon to try non-categorical
takings cases and it is to the litigator "in the trenches" that this article
is primarily addressed.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY TAKINGS DOCTRINE
After the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zon-
ing in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,28 few would have ex-
pected that a half-century would pass before it handed down another
major constitutional land-use decision. When the Court finally did
speak, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,29 it
ushered in a new era-one in which land-use law was no longer the
virtually exclusive province of state legislatures and courts.
In Penn Central, the owner of Grand Central terminal claimed that
the New York City Landmarks Law was unconstitutional because it
prevented Penn Central's development of the air space above the Ter-
minal, a designated landmark.3" Penn Central argued that the
Landmarks Law completely destroyed its ability to use its "air rights"
productively, and thereby caused a taking of its property.3'
A majority of the Supreme Court rejected this challenge, holding
that takings jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
components to ascertain whether rights in one of them has been de-
stroyed.32 Rather, the proper focus is on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.33 Having concluded
27. Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
28. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
29. 438 U.S. 104 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id. at 129-30.
32. Id. at 130.
33. Id. at 130-31.
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that the Landmarks Law did not interfere with Penn Central's right to
a reasonable return from its long-standing productive use of Grand
Central Terminal, the Court determined that no taking had
occurred.34
The Penn Central dissent came from a voice that was then in the
minority on many issues, current Chief Justice William Rehnquist.35
Justice Rehnquist noted that the Landmarks Law did not prevent a
narrow band of noxious uses, as does a typical zoning ordinance, but
instead placed an affirmative duty on a tiny number of property own-
ers in New York City (approximately 400) to preserve their structures
and thereby maintain the city's architectural and historic heritage.36
According to the dissent, this "servitude," which prevented Penn Cen-
tral from increasing the height of Grand Central Terminal or other-
wise making use of its air rights, placed the entire cost of preservation
on a few property owners rather than spreading it across the general
public.37 As a result, the dissenters indicated that they would have
found a taking.38
With the decision in Penn Central, the battle escalated over the ex-
tent to which government land-use controls could legitimately regu-
late the use and development of private property. Perhaps because of
the enormity of the issues involved, the Supreme Court moved slowly
after Penn Central. The Court refused to hear a number of cases, re-
manding due to lack of ripeness.39 To the extent that the Court did
decide regulatory takings cases, it broke little new ground.
For example, in the years immediately following Penn Central, the
Court regularly acknowledged the vitality of the principle established
in Pennsylvania Coal-that a regulation which goes too far is a tak-
ing.40 However, the Court's reaffirmation was perceived by other
courts as somewhat tepid. For example, the highest courts in the
states of New York and California held that a land-use regulation that
goes too far is a denial of due process of law-not a taking-and that
the appropriate remedy would be a declaration of the regulation's un-
constitutionality.41 Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly refused to
34. Id. at 138.
35. Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Ste-
vens. Id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. Id at 138-40.
37. Id at 143.
38. Id at 144.
39. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
40. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979).
41. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
Fred F. French Investment Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
1995]
572 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
resolve this issue in Agins v. City of Tiburon,nz and instead merely
reiterated its fundamental two-pronged constitutional test:
The application of a general zoning law to particular property ef-
fects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests ... or [if it] denies an owner economically
viable use of his property.43
Following Agins came Justice Brennan's noteworthy dissent in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego." There, Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, Stewart, and Powell (not a group generally known to
be antagonistic toward government regulation) indicated that they
were prepared to hold that a land-use regulation that goes too far
causes a taking and requires payment of just compensation.45 Justice
Rehnquist, who stated explicitly that he agreed with the dissenters on
the merits, nevertheless voted with the majority to remand the case on
ripeness grounds.46
With Justice Brennan's powerful dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec-
tric Co. paving the way, the Court finally acted decisively in 1987
when it handed down First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County.47 From that point until the present, under the
leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, the Supreme
Court has put teeth into its oft-repeated holding that a regulation that
"goes too far" causes a taking of property. In so doing, the Court, in a
variety of cases, has established certain bedrock principles of modern
regulatory takings jurisprudence:
1. A government regulation that "goes too far" is not simply a de-
nial of due process of law, but is a taking of property for which just
compensation must be paid."
2. A per se or categorical taking occurs when a regulation deprives
a property owner of all economically viable or productive use of prop-
erty, unless the government establishes that the prohibited uses were
not part of the property owner's title to begin with under established
principles of property and nuisance law.49
42. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
43. Id. at 260. As a simple formulation of the overall constitutional test, Agins is
still viable and often cited. See, e.g., Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d
1059, 1066-68 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
44. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981).
45. Id. at 649.
46. Id. at 634-36 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
47. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). It is important to note that First English was one of three
land-use cases handed down by the Supreme Court that term. The others are Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
48. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892-93 (1992);
First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
49. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
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3. If a regulation temporarily deprives a property owner of all eco-
nomically viable or productive use of property, then just compensa-
tion must be paid for the period of time during which such a
deprivation has occurred. 50
4. A physical occupation of private property by government cou-
pled with an ouster of the owner causes a per se taking, even if there is
no substantial interference with actual use of the property.515. An exaction or condition imposed upon a property owner as a
result of the application of land-use regulations must:
a. be substantially related to a legitimate governmental purpose;
52
and
b. be "roughly proportional" to the impacts anticipated from the
proposed development.53
Despite the importance of these holdings, other critically important
questions remain unanswered:
What is the unit of property that is the appropriate focus for the
takings analysis? Does a taking occur if a single strand in the bundle
of property rights-such as the right to exclude others-is destroyed?
Does a taking occur if all economically viable or productive use of a
portion of the property is destroyed?
If a regulation does not destroy all economically viable or produc-
tive use of property, when, if ever, can a taking occur? In other
words, how far is "too far"? Is there a bright line after which a dimi-
nution in value inherently causes a taking?
At what point does the loss of a property owner's legitimate invest-
ment-backed expectations cause a taking to occur? Is such an inquiry
functionally the same as determining diminution in value?
Can a meaningful test be developed to more accurately predict
when government regulation goes "too far"?
The extent to which these and other questions have been answered
by the courts is the focus of the remainder of this article.
II. THE WHOLE PARCEL ISSUE
When a land-use regulation is claimed to cause a taking, it typically
is alleged that the provision so severely restricts use or development
that it has precluded all reasonably productive or economically viable
50. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
51. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
52. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
53. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994):
We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encapsulates what we
hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathemati-
cal calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individual-
ized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.
1995]
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use of the property.54 If the land-use regulation requires that every
single square inch of a parcel of land be kept in its natural state, a
taking invariably has occurred." A more vexing problem arises when
an owner claims that the ability to make productive use of a portion of
the property is destroyed.56
Although it would appear that such a claim was conclusively re-
jected in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist refused to abandon the posi-
tion he staked out in his dissent. In a footnote presaging the thorny
"whole parcel" issue, Justice Rehnquist noted the difficult conceptual
and legal problems created by the rule that a taking occurs only where
all reasonable return on property is denied: "Not only must the Court
define 'reasonable return' for a variety of types of property... but the
Court must define the particular property unit that should be ex-
amined. [If the Landmarks Law] restricted Penn Central's use of its
'air rights,' all return has been denied. ' 57 If, however, the majority in
Penn Central is correct, then the whole parcel is the entire property
and, at worst, Penn Central lost the right to maximize its profit, but
could still make a reasonable return.
Nine years later, the whole parcel issue figured prominently in Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.58 There, a coalition of
coal companies challenged the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act,59 which required that fifty
percent of the coal beneath certain structures be kept in the ground to
provide surface support. The companies claimed that the Act took all
of the value of this coal, and thus completely destroyed one of the
strands of their bundle of property rights-the "support estate."'
Relying upon Penn Central, a majority of the Court held that the 27
million tons of coal left unmined did not constitute a separate segment
of property for purposes of takings law.6' This coal, which constituted
less than two percent of the coal companies' in-ground reserves, was
considered to be no different than land that must be left vacant be-
54. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 (1980).
55. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
56. The whole parcel problem is of concern only in the regulatory takings context.
In the physical takings context, the Supreme Court has clarified that a permanent
physical invasion and occupation of even a tiny portion of property causes a taking of
the portion of the property so invaded and occupied. Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
57. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 112 n.13 (1978)
(emphasis in original).
58. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
59. Id. at 474, citing The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.1-1406.21 (1994).
60. Pennsylvania was unique in recognizing the "support estate" as a distinct inter-
est in land that can be conveyed separately from either the mineral estate or the
surface estate. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500.
61. Id. at 498.
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cause of the imposition of setbacks.6" Setbacks do not cause a taking
of the unusable land because the property must be valued as a
whole.63
Similarly, the majority held that the support estate could not be
treated separately from the remainder of the property owner's bundle
of rights.6 Thus, the destruction of the support estate was deemed
analogous to the destruction of Penn Central's air rights.6
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented once again.66 He argued that the
majority's focus on the ability of the coal companies to make a profit
from their entire holdings highlighted the need to define the relevant
property for purposes of takings jurisprudence.67 The dissent urged
that the Act destroyed all value in the coal just as effectively as if
there had been a physical invasion of the coal companies' property
and the government mined the coal itself.68 Under these circum-
stances, the dissenters would find a taking.69 Similarly, the dissent
considered the support estate individually and found a taking, as the
Act destroyed all value in that estate.7°
Interestingly, the dissent's approach was the basis for a Supreme
Court opinion just ninety days later in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.7' There, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion that
struck down a land-use regulation because it destroyed an essential
stick in the property owner's bundle of rights-the right to exclude
others.7' The Coastal Commission had required a property owner to
grant a public access easement as a condition of receiving approval to
construct a single-family home on an oceanfront lot.73 The Nollan
majority held that such a condition would destroy one of the most
essential sticks in a property owner's bundle of rights and, therefore,
would constitute a taking.74
The Supreme Court has also found a taking in other contexts in
which the challenged government regulation did not cause the perma-
nent destruction of all economically viable or productive use of the
62. A setback is a portion of a lot upon which building is not permitted. Setbacks
are imposed to assure a minimum amount of light and air, as well as to provide ingress
and egress for fire and emergency vehicles.
63. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498.
64. Id- at 500-02.
65. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (loss of quarry
rights not deemed a taking when compared to the rights the owner retained in the
property as a whole).
66. Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined in the dissent.
67. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 514-15.
68. Id at 517-18.
69. Ia
70. Id. at 518-20.
71. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
72. Id. at 839.
73. Id. at 828.
74. Id. at 831.
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entire fee interest (the total bundle of rights) in the whole property
(every square inch of an owner's land). For example, a temporary de-
struction of such rights was held to constitute a taking.75 The govern-
ment's mandate that property owners allow cable television
companies to run their lines on or over private property constituted a
taking.76 Rather than insist upon the destruction of all interests in the
entire property, the Court focused upon the presence of a physical
invasion of property and a destruction of the right to exclude others-
a single strand of the bundle of rights."
Thus, despite Penn Central and similar cases, takings have been
found in a variety of contexts when either less than all of the property
was affected or less than all of the strands in the owner's bundle of
rights were destroyed. 78 Moreover, in the Supreme Court's two re-
cent major land-use takings cases, the conservative majority has gone
out of its way to emphasize that the whole parcel issue is not settled
law.79 For the time being, this has left the state and lower federal
courts to grapple with the issue.
Some federal courts have followed the Penn Central rationale and
refused to focus on anything less than the full fee interest in the entire
property. For example, in Deltona Corp. v. United States,80 the prop-
erty owner had purchased 10,000 acres of land in 1964 for a mixed-use
waterfront development. The property was to be developed in phases.
When the developer sought approval from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") for the work, its successive applications were
treated differently as the Corps' regulations became increasingly more
stringent over time. After approving permits for two of the phases,
the Corps denied permits for the last three phases.81
The Court of Claims refused to find a taking, holding that the denial
of the permits did not destroy all economically viable use of the prop-
erty as a whole.82 The developer had retained valuable development
rights in upland property that did not require a Corps permit.8 3 More-
75. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987).
76. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); see
also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
77. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
78. Compare Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (taking did not arise from the
government's declaration that eagle feathers and other bird artifacts cannot be sold)
with Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (disposition at death was another one of the
strands of the bundle of rights that could not be abrogated).
79. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992); see
also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316, 2324 (1994). But see Concrete Pipe
& Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust For S. Cal., 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2290 (1993) (applying the whole property analysis articulated in Penn Central).
80. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
81. Id at 1188-89.
82. Id at 1192-93.
83. Id. at 1192.
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over, the property owner was able to develop large portions of its en-
tire property before any permits were denied.84 Thus, the Court
declined to find a taking where prior development of property owned
by the developer had been put to productive use and the challenged
determination left the owner with development rights with value sub-
stantially exceeding their original cost.8 5
Other federal court decisions appear to have eroded the "whole
parcel" concept as enunciated in Penn Central. For example, when
local zoning treated two contiguous properties in common ownership
differently, the Ninth Circuit held that the constitutionality of the zon-
ing of each parcel should be examined separately.86 The same result
was reached when commonly owned non-contiguous properties were
zoned differently.87
One of the leading "whole parcel" cases is Florida Rock Industries,
Inc. v. United States.88 In that case, Florida Rock purchased 1560
acres of land for limestone mining. The company sought permission
from the Corps of Engineers to mine its land. However, the Corps
would consider an application for only ninety-eight acres-the
amount that Florida Rock could put to use over a three year period.
The Corps would not entertain an application for a longer period of
time. When the Corps denied the permit, Florida Rock claimed that
the only use of its property had been destroyed.89 The Corps argued
that the ninety-eight-acre parcel could not be considered separate and
apart from the balance of Florida Rock's property.90 The Court of
Appeals treated the ninety-eight-acre parcel as the "whole parcel," in
part because the Corps itself would not allow Florida Rock to apply
for a permit for a larger area.91
84. Id. at 1192.
85. id.; see also Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
86. American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.
1981).
87. Kaiser Dev. Co. v. City & County of Honolulu, 649 F. Supp. 926 (D. Haw.
1986), aff'd, 898 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1990).
88. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). Florida Rock
is a long saga that appears to be completed. It currently consists of a total of four
reported opinions. In chronological order, they are Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) (granting compensation) [hereinafter Florida Rockf]; Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (vacating
grant of compensation) [hereinafter Florida Rock If]; Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (reversed; granted compensation, including attor-
ney's fees) [hereinafter Florida Rock I11]; Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995) (vacating compensa-
tion and remanding) [hereinafter Florida Rock IV].
89. Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1563, citing Florida Rock 1, 8 Cl. Ct. at 164.
90. Florida Rock 11, 791 F.2d at 896 (government produced expert witness testi-
mony of value of entire 1560 acres).
91. Florida Rock II, 791 F.2d at 904-05.
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A similar result was reached in Loveladies Harbor v. United
States.9' There, the Court of Appeals refused to establish a bright-line
test that the "whole parcel" is the portion of the property for which a
developer seeks a permit. Instead, the Court noted that prior prece-
dents favored a flexible approach that would account for factual vari-
ances in individual cases.93 Not surprisingly, the decision in
Loveladies turned on the manner in which government had treated
the property owner over the course of a twenty-five-year period of
development.94
Loveladies involved the proposed development of a fifty-one-acre
parcel that was the last undeveloped portion of what was originally a
250-acre tract.95 One hundred ninety-nine acres of the property had
been developed by the owner prior to the enactment of various wet-
land protection regulations.96 After promulgation of the wetland reg-
ulations, the owner proposed to develop the remaining fifty-one-acre
parcel.97 The State of New Jersey fought the development proposal
because virtually all of the acreage was wetlands that could not have
been developed without being filled.98
Eventually, after litigation and a contentious battle between the de-
veloper and the state, the developer agreed to develop only 12.5 acres
and to dedicate the remaining 38.5 acres for preservation as undis-
turbed wetlands. However, state approval was insufficient in and of
itself to enable the project to move forward, as the developer also
needed approval from the Army Corps of Engineers. When the Corps
sought comments from the state, the state recommended denial of the
permit.99 The Corps eventually denied the permit and the property
owner claimed that the United States took its 12.5 acres of
property. 1°°
The United States contended that any diminution in value of the
12.5 acres caused by the denial of the permit should be measured
against the fair market value of the 250-acre property as a whole.' 0'
92. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
93. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181.
94. Id. (pointing out that New Jersey allowed development over a number of years
since 1958, and the trial court's decision to omit this acreage from.the "denominator"
or the total parcel was not clear error).
95. Id at 1173-74.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1174 (although the state of New Jersey gave a permit under the terms of
a settlement, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, when con-
tacted by the Corps as required for a permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. § 1344 (1988)), denied that its permit approval indicated compliance with state
requirements and nevertheless recommended disapproval of the § 404 permit).
100. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1173.
101. Id at 1180 (referring to the "denominator problem," mentioned in Florida
Rock IV, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cii. 1994)).
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The developer countered by arguing that the "whole parcel" is the
12.5 acres that the Corps prevented from being developed.0 2 The
Federal Circuit agreed with the developer. 10 3 It rejected measuring
value against the total 250-acre parcel because 199 acres had been
developed before the wetland regulations were in effect.'" It also re-
jected the idea that the fifty-one-acre tract was the whole parcel be-
cause the developer agreed to relinquish development rights for 38.5
acres in exchange for the right to develop 12.5 acres. 15 The Court
could not see why the developer should be forced to include the value
of the 38.5 acres in the whole parcel when the developer was forced to
give up the value of that property to obtain state development ap-
proval for the 12.5-acre tract.'06 Thus, the Court held that the 12.5
acres was the whole parcel for purposes of evaluating the Corps per-
mit denial.0 7 Since the permit denial precluded all use of the 12.5-
acre parcel, a taking occurred.10 8
This fact-based ad hoc inquiry was also applied in Ciampitti v.
United States.10 9 In Ciampitti, the United States Claims Court noted
that a legitimate taking can be disguised if the whole property is de-
fined too broadly, and an artificial taking can occur if the whole prop-
erty is defined too narrowly. 110 Accordingly, the Claims Court
focused on identifying the relevant parcel as realistically and fairly as
possible, given the entire factual and regulatory environment."' Fac-
tors the Court identified as relevant include the degree of contiguity;
dates of acquisition; the extent to which the parcel has been treated as
102. Id. at 1181.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ("It would seem ungrateful in the extreme to require Loveladies to convey
to the public the rights in the 38.5 acres in exchange for the right to develop 12.5
acres, and then to include the value of the grant as a charge against the givers.").
107. Id. at 1181-82.
108. Due to the complicated and unique set of facts in Loveladies, its precedential
value ultimately may be limited. Id. at 1181 ("Our precedent displays a flexible ap-
proach, designed to account for factual nuances."). However, Loveladies does fall in
line with the pattern shown in Florida Rock II of treating commonly owned land
separately for takings purposes when governmental regulation treated such land in
distinct fashion.
109. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
110. Ciampitti, 22 Cl. Ct. at 318-19.
111. Id. at 318-19:
The effect of a taking can obviously be disguised if the property at issue is
too broadly defined. Conversely, a taking can appear to emerge if the prop-
erty is viewed too narrowly. The effort should be to identify the parcel as
realistically and fairly as possible, given the entire factual and regulatory
environment.
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a single unit; and the extent to which the undevelopable or protected
lands enhance the value of the remaining lands.112
In New York, the Court of Appeals traditionally has applied the
Penn Central whole parcel requirement. In Spears v. Berle,"3 involv-
ing the ability of a property owner to mine on wetland property, the
Court of Appeals stated that:
A petitioner who challenges land regulations must sustain a heavy
burden of proof, demonstrating that under no permissible use
would the parcel as a whole be capable of producing a reasonable
return or be adaptable to other suitable private use. 1
More recently, however, where the rights to possession and exclu-
sion of others were destroyed, the Court of Appeals leaned toward
acceptance of the idea of "conceptual severance"-focusing upon and
assessing the value of the rights taken without regard to its relation-
ship to the value of the whole property." 5 In Seawall Associates v.
City of New York, 1 6 the Court struck down a New York City law re-
quiring the owners of single room occupancy ("SRO") residential
buildings to continue to use their property for SRO purposes. The
Court stated:
By any criterion-whether the property rights abolished or im-
paired are considered alone, as in Hodel and Nollan, or the values
of these rights are compared with the values of the properties as a
whole, as in Penn Central and Keystone-the conclusion is ines-
capable that the effect of the provisions is unconstitutionally to de-
prive owners of economically viable use of their properties."17
Without any firm doctrinal guidance from the Supreme Court, the
state and lower federal courts rely upon an essentially ad hoc review
of relevant facts and circumstances to arrive at a definition of the
whole parcel. However, from Florida Rock and Loveladies, it is clear
that if government singles out a portion of property for separate regu-
112. Id. at 318; see also Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992),
aff'd, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (refusing to determine as matter of law a definition
of the "whole parcel" and engaging in a fact-based inquiry).
113. 397 N.E.2d 1304 (N.Y. 1979).
114. Spears, 397 N.E.2d at 1308; see also Pecora v. Gossin, 356 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup.
Ct. 1974), aff'd, 370 N.Y.S.2d 281 (App. Div. 1975) (one parcel of landowner's prop-
erty would not be considered in isolation from other parts of his property).
115. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1067-68 (N.Y.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
116. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
117. Seawall, 542 N.E.2d at 1068; see also Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643
N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that the destruction of a reversionary property inter-
est, in this case by a statute that compels landlords to offer renewal leases of rent-
stabilized apartments to a not-for-profit hospital so that the hospital can sublease the
apartments to its staff, can cause a regulatory taking that does not further a legitimate
state interest and is therefore unconstitutional).
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latory treatment, then that will be considered the "whole parcel" in
the takings analysis.118
As a practical strategic matter, property owners will always claim
that a destruction of one strand of the owner's bundle of rights or loss
of the ability to develop one portion of the property is the "whole
parcel" that should be focused upon for purposes of determining
whether a taking has occurred. Conversely, government will always
attempt to show that what has been destroyed is merely a small por-
tion of the value of the property as a whole. Given the huge impact
that determination of the size of the whole parcel has on the takings
formula, many cases will be won or lost simply on the basis of whether
the rights destroyed were deemed to be part of the larger whole parcel
or whether those rights were themselves the whole parcel. While Penn
Central is still the last word from the Supreme Court, the lower state
and federal courts have not applied the Penn Central whole parcel
formulation rigidly, and in some cases, not at all.119
III. How FAR Is Too FAR?
Once the whole parcel is defined, the next step in the typical takings
case is to determine whether the impact of the governmental regula-
tion has caused such a substantial loss in the value of the property that
a taking has occurred. At one extreme, Lucas establishes that a com-
plete destruction of all productive or economically viable use of prop-
erty constitutes a taking. In most cases, however, property is not so
severely impacted by governmental regulation. Rather, the property
owner suffers a large loss and claims that as a result the regulation
"goes too far."
In Lucas, the Court specifically acknowledged that a property
owner who lost ninety-five percent of the value of property might not
recover at all.' 20 Although such a property owner would not be able
to claim a categorical taking, he could still invoke the Penn Central
test in which the economic impact upon the property owner and the
extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct investment-
backed expectations are considered along with the character and na-
ture of the government's action. 121 Historically, such claims have not
always been successful. 22
118. See supra notes 101-112 and accompanying text (describing the "denominator
problem").
119. See Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(discussing several cases and using a flexible approach based on factual nuances) (ci-
tations omitted).
120. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 n.8 (1992).
121. Id. ("[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and ... the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally").
122. The fair market value of the property in question was reduced by approxi-
mately 75% in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), approxi-
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It was well established, prior to Lucas, that a regulation, as applied
to a particular property, may effect a taking if it does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests, 23 or if it "denies an owner econom-
ically viable use of his land.' 1 24
In Penn Central, the Court conceded that there was no fixed
formula for determining when the application of a regulation results
in a taking.125 Rather, the Supreme Court characterized the process
as based on
ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular
case.... To aid in this determination, however, we have identified
three factors which have "particular significance". (1) "the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-backed ex-
pectations"; and (3) "the character of the government action". 26
In focusing on the extent to which government regulation impacts
upon the economic viability of property, a court may combine the first
two of these factors.'27 As a part of this analysis, the court must com-
pare the value of the property before the challenged government ac-
tion with the value after the government action. The economic impact
upon property must be considered in light of the character of the gov-
ernmental regulation. Despite the formulation of these general guide-
lines in Penn Central more than fifteen years ago, precious little has
come from the Supreme Court regarding how this ad hoc inquiry actu-
ally should be undertaken.
A. Value Before and Value After and Reasonable Return on
Investment
The test for when a governmental regulation goes "too far" is often
expressed as a comparison between the fair market value of the prop-
erty prior to the effective date of the challenged regulation and the
fair market value of the property just after the effective date of the
challenged regulation. If all or all but a bare residue of the property's
mately 88% in Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), and approximately 95% in
William C. Haas Co. v. San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979).
123. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
124. Id (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36(1978)); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
125. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24.
126. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 494-95 (1987) and cases cited therein. When Justice Holmes linked the amount
of loss suffered by a property owner to causation of a regulatory taking in Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon, he recognized that the inquiry was essentially an ad hoc pro-
cess involving issues of diminution of value and reciprocity of benefits. See
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922).
127. See Florida Rock II, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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value has been destroyed, a taking has occurred. 128 In Village of Eu-
clid, the Supreme Court upheld the zoning of property even though
the zoning destroyed approximately seventy-five percent of the prop-
erty's value. 29 Thus, as far back as the 1920s, when zoning was in its
fledgling stages, a diminution of seventy-five percent of value after
imposition of a new land-use regulation was not held to be severe
enough to cause a taking.
To establish sufficient diminution in value, both sides in a regulatory
takings case will engage in a battle of expert appraisers to establish
the relative values of the property prior to and after the alleged tak-
ing. This battle occurs in the eminent domain context on a regular
basis-but with one key difference. In an eminent domain proceed-
ing, the testimony regarding fair market value is used solely to estab-
lish the amount of damages that will be paid for a taking that is
acknowledged to have already occurred. In the context of a regula-
tory taking challenge, however, such valuation testimony is used to
establish whether a taking has occurred at all. Thus, in a regulatory
takings case, if the property owner's valuation testimony is not be-
lieved, the property owner will have no taking claim and will receive
nothing. In an eminent domain case, the worst that usually occurs if
the property owner's appraiser is not believed is that the property
owner will receive less in damages.
The critical importance of appraisal testimony in establishing dimi-
nution in value (or rebutting a property owner's claimed diminution)
is vividly demonstrated by the Florida Rock litigation.13 ° In Florida
Rock, the United States submitted an appraisal based on comparable
sales that showed that there was a substantial market comprised of
speculators at the time of the alleged taking. To counter the substan-
tial value shown by the government's appraisal, Florida Rock submit-
ted an appraisal that rejected all comparable sales because the
purchasers ostensibly lacked sufficient knowledge of the applicable
wetland regulations. 13 1 Florida Rock contended that any potential
purchaser who had full knowledge would offer no more than a nomi-
nal amount for the property. 132 The United States Claims Court ac-
cepted Florida Rock's appraisal, found that the property had virtually
no value after the imposition of the regulations, and concluded that a
taking occurred. 133 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the
128. De St. Aubin v. Flacke, 496 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1986); Spears v. Berle, 397
N.E.2d 1304 (N.Y. 1979).
129. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396-97 (1926).
130. As of this writing, Florida Rock is before the Court of Claims for the third
time due to two reversals from the Federal Circuit.
131. Florida Rock 1, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 167 (1985).
132. Id.
133. I.
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United States Claims Court erroneously accepted Florida Rock's ap-
praisal and rejected the government's appraisal.13 4
In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that a viable real estate mar-
ket may be comprised of speculators and that such potential specula-
tive purchasers need not be only persons who are legally trained or
legally advised. 3 ' Rather, the Federal Circuit held that if a viable
market for real estate existed at the time the regulations were applied
to the property, then even if that market is comprised of speculators,
the value of property as indicated by comparable sales must be consid-
ered in determining fair market value.' 36
In most cases, the appraisal testimony that is finally accepted by the
court will demonstrate a diminution in value, but not a destruction of
all value. Under such circumstances, the courts require something
more than diminution in value to find a taking has occurred. Fre-
quently, that "something more" is that the owner has been denied the
current use of the property or that all permitted uses of the property
will fail to yield the owner any reasonable economic return.
For example, in Grimpel Associates v. Cohalan,37 approximately
ninety-two percent of the value of the property was destroyed by a
rezoning from "Business II" to "Residence AA.' ' 38 However, this
"mere" diminution in value was not enough, in and of itself, to cause a
taking.'39 While the New, York Court of Appeals held that such a
reduction in value was "not itself dispositive of the constitutional is-
sue, proof of a drastic reduction in value tends to establish that the
property is not reasonably suited for the uses prescribed by the zoning
ordinance."' 4 ° In addition to the diminution in fair market value, the
Court of Appeals looked to the ability of the property owner to obtain
a reasonable economic return from each of the permitted uses and
found that the area was not suited for residential use, as it was sur-
rounded by major thoroughfares and commercial establishments, a4'
and that the plaintiff did not have to prove unsuitability for the public
uses allowed under Residence AA.'4 z
134. Florida Rock 11, 791 F.2d 893, 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reversed the trial court's
finding that a taking had occurred by discounting the trial court's assertion that gov-
ernment's higher appraisal was based on unscrupulous speculators who would always
seem to find someone willing to buy land in Florida at a price).
135. Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d 1560, 1566 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 898 (1995).
136. Florida Rock II, 791 F.2d at 896-97 (referring to "numerous inquiries about
possible sale of the property by Florida Rock and one offer of $4,000 an acre").
137. 361 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1977).
138. Id. at 1023-24.
139. Id. at 1024; see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 n.8 (1992) (acknowledging
that even in instances where 95% of the value of property is destroyed there is no
categorical taking-something more must be shown).
140. Grimpel, 361 N.E.2d at 1024.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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Because the plaintiff was able to prove both a very large diminution
in value, as well as that the "return from the property would not be
reasonable for each and every permitted use under the ordinance...
and that no reasonable return could be had from any permitted
use," '143 the Appellate Division found a taking had occurred.' 44 Thus,
in affirming the decision of the Appellate Division, the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that a taking occurs when there is a very
large diminution in value (approximately ninety-two percent) and
when the property owner is unable to obtain a reasonable economic
return from any permitted use. 145
Soon after Grimpel, in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Town of East Hamp-
ton, 46 the Appellate Division held that a property owner must show
more than a "significant diminution in value" and must show that he
or she cannot receive a reasonable return:147
The owner who attacks a zoning ordinance as violative of the Fifth
Amendment on the ground that its economic impact amounts to
confiscation, "must show more than the current zoning classification
has caused a significant diminution in value, or that a substantially
higher value could be obtained if an alternate use is permitted.
Rather, the proper test is whether the owner can presently receive a
reasonable return on his property." . . . Such an owner must estab-
lish affirmatively that the regulation eliminates all reasonable re-
turn, . . . and this must be accomplished by "dollars and cents"
proof.... To establish de facto confiscation, evidence of the market
value of the property at time of acquisition as well as the value of
the property as presently zoned is required. 48
Moreover, the Appellate Division was not satisfied with proof of in-
ability to obtain a reasonable return on the property solely for the
purpose for which it was obtained. 149 Thus, even though the devel-
It was not incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that its property was not suita-
ble for various public or quasi-public uses permitted by the residential zon-
ing classification such as church, school, college, public library, municipal
building or municipal park. To confine private property to' public uses alone
amounts to an appropriation of property rights for the benefit of the public
without compensation therefor.
Id.
143. See Grimpel Assocs. v. Cohalan, 380 N.Y.S.2d 279,282 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd,
361 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1977).
144. Although the Court appears to distinguish between value and reasonable re-
turn, it then appears to equate them by concluding that "[t]he diminution in value of
the magnitude above-described is tantamount to confiscation .... " Id.
145. Grimpel, 361 N.E.2d at 1024.
146. 442 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 1981).
147. Id. at 127.
148. Id. (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 128 (plaintiff provided evidence on development costs of houses on large
acreage, but "[w]hat plaintiff made no effort to prove however, was the current value
of the property or that it could not produce a reasonable return if marketed as a
single tract under current zoning). A review of the facts in Curtiss-Wright is appropri-
ate. Curtiss-Wright, a developer, purchased a 1357-acre tract in the town of East
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oper proved that the cost of houses suited to the large lots mandated
by the zoning, plus the cost of developing such lots, would exceed the
sale price for houses in the area, no taking was proven.150 The Appel-
late Division indicated that the property owner must also prove that it
could not produce a reasonable return if it marketed the property as a
single unsubdivided tract under the current zoning.' 5 ' Thus, Curtiss-
Wright's takings claim failed because it did not prove that the prop-
erty could not be sold, as is, for a reasonable return.152
Both Grimpel and Curtiss-Wright rely heavily on the concept of rea-
sonable return as a limitation on the "value before/value after" test.
Although many zoning and environmental regulations can cause sub-
stantial, even huge, diminutions in value, the New York State courts
will not find a taking (absent destruction of all or virtually all value)
unless the property owner cannot also receive a reasonable return on
any use of the property or its sale.
This emphasis on reasonable return on investment as a key factor in
the takings analysis was continued in Seawall Associates v. City of New
York.'53 There, the Court of Appeals noted that the city's SRO Local
Law prohibited "the sole use-entirely permissible before the enact-
ment of the law-for which investment properties are purchased:
commercial development."'5 4 The Court of Appeals distinguished
Seawall from Penn Central 55 and Keystone Bituminous Coal,5 6 stat-
ing that in neither of the latter two cases was the property owner de-
nied continued use of the property or a reasonable return on the
investment.1 7
In essence, the inability of the property owner to obtain a reason-
able return on an investment has been utilized in situations in which
the "value before/value after" test shows a very large diminution in
value, but not one that in and of itself is sufficient to cause a taking as
a matter of law-that is, a categorical taking. In addition, the reason-
able investment-backed expectations of the property owner determine
whether the destruction of a large portion of the property's value
causes a taking. At least one court has concluded that existing gov-
ernmental regulations form a backdrop against which reasonable ex-
Hampton. The tract was zoned Residence B, which allowed half-acre lot sizes. In
1968, the town adopted a zoning plan, the "Voorhis Plan," and rezoned a large por-
tion of the town, including Curtiss-Wright's remaining 777 acres in 1972 (other acre-
age had been conveyed), to Residence A, which required two-acre lots. Thus, Curtiss-
Wright would not be able to develop as many home sites as when the land was ac-
quired. Id. at 127.
150. Id. at 128.
151. Id.
152. Id
153. 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
154. Id. at 1067.
155. Id. at 1067-68.
156. Id
157. Id at 1068.
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pectations of pro perty owners are to be measured. In M & J Coal Co.
v. United States,' a coal company obtained state permits to mine and
deeds to surface property that it asserted gave it the right to mine coal
in a manner that would cause the surface of the land to subside. 59
Such mining activities were in conflict with federal mining regula-
tions. 6 ° In upholding the applicability of the federal mining regula-
tions against a takings challenge, the Federal Circuit noted that the
mining operator knew or should have known of the existence of the
federal regulations at the time the property owner took title.16 '
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the right to mine in contra-
vention of the federal mining regulations was not part of the bundle of
rights that the coal company received when it took title to the prop-
erty. 62 In that regard, the Federal Circuit considered the federal min-
ing regulations to be analogous to limitations on title that arise from
other antecedent legal restrictions, such as the common law of nui-
sance.163 Indeed, the Federal Circuit went so far as to conclude that
the existence of the federal regulations at the time a property owner
took title would preclude just compensation even if the regulations
deprived the property owner of all economically viable use of the
property. 64
However, when new regulations are adopted-even vis-a-vis heav-
ily regulated industries such as banking-their imposition can destroy
legitimate investment-backed expectations and cause a taking. Such
was the case in Branch v. United States.165 In Branch, a bank holding
company, Bank of New England Corp. ("BNEC"), went insolvent,
and under the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act 166 and in particular its "cross-guarantee provision,"'1 67 its
158. 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
159. Id. at 1150-51.
160. Id at 1150 (citing the Surface Miniing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988), and in particular, 30 U.S.C. § 1271 (1988), which autho-
rizes the'Secretary of Interior or designee to order cessation of surface mining and
reclamation operations).
161. Id. at 1154:
Thus, at the time M & J acquired its mining rights, whatever they were, it
knew or should have known that it could not mine in such a way as to endan-
ger public health or safety and that any state authorization it may have re-
ceived was subordinate to the national standards that were established under
SMCRA and enforced by OSM [Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement].
Id.
162. Id. at 1154.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1155 ("Justice and fairness do not require that the community at large
bear the 'burden' of M & J's inability to mine in a manner that is safe to the public.")
(citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
165. 31 Fed. Cl. 626 (1994).
166. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
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"controlled" bank, Maine National Bank ("MNB"), was hit by the
FDIC with an assessment of over $1 billion.16 8 The plaintiff, a trustee
of the holding company, sued on behalf of MNB for the return of "not
less than $65 million,"'169 alleging a taking for a public purpose without
just compensation. 170  The court concluded that the investment-
backed expectations requirement limits takings recoveries to those
owners who can demonstrate that they bought their property in reli-
ance upon a state of affairs that does not include the challenged regu-
latory scheme. 17
Thus, although the phrases sound similar, "no reasonable economic
return" must be distinguished from "frustration of investment-backed
expectations." The courts require a property owner to show that "no
reasonable economic return" can be generated from property as an
aid in resolving takings cases when there has been a very large dimi-
nution in value. The term "frustration of investment-backed expecta-
tions" is used by the courts as describing an eligibility hurdle a
property owner must overcome in order to be able to establish the
requisite economic loss.
B. Highest and Best Use of Property
To determine the property's fair market value both prior to and af-
ter the application of the challenged regulation, one must determine
its highest and best use.172  Although a property's fair market value is
normally based upon its existing use, under certain circumstances the
value of a potential use of the property, its highest and best use, can
be included in its fair market value. 173
167. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
168. Branch, 31 Fed. Cl. at 629.
169. Id. The sum of $65 million represented the net worth of MNB. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 637. Expectations were key in Branch:
The court must determine plaintiff's investment-backed interests at the time
the taking occurred. If the individual banks within the multi-bank system
ignored the corporate form and were operating as a single entity they would
not have a reasonable expectation that their corporate form would be
respected regarding their liability for their parent and sister banks' debts....
If MNB did respect its corporate form, it could hold an historically-rooted
expectation that it would not become liable for BNEC's debts. If the evi-
dence warrants such a finding, the court must also conclude that MNB has
suffered a taking.
Id. at 637 (court denied motions for summary judgment by both parties and ordered a
trial with the limited scope of determining whether or not MNB and BNEC operated
within corporate forms).
172. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 335-36 (1992); see also United
States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943) (valuation "may reflect not only the use
to which the property is presently devoted but also that use to which it may be readily
converted").
173. Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 335-36.
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Highest and best use is "[t]he reasonably probable and legal use of
vacant land or improved property, which is physically possible, appro-
priately supported, financially feasible, and results in the highest
value.' 1 74 To establish a potential use as the highest and best use, a
property owner must prove that the potential use is physically possi-
ble, financially feasible, and that the property could have been readily
converted to such a use in the near future. 75 If the property owner
cannot satisfy all three tests, then the use will be considered specula-
tive and the fair market value of the property cannot, as a matter of
law, include any value attributed to the speculative use.1 76
One of the most difficult aspects of highest and best use determina-
tions is whether property can be readily converted to the purported
highest and best use if a governmental permit is a necessary precondi-
tion to commencing such a use. If a governmental permit is necessary,
the claimant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that
all applicable governmental permits could have been obtained within
a discreet foreseeable time period.' 77 For example, if the potential use
would require a rezoning, then the property owner must establish that
there is a reasonable probability that the local government would so
rezone the property in the proximate future.' 78
Often, attempting to prove whether such a permit or approval could
be obtained is a case unto itself within the overall takings litigation. It
is quite common that a very large diminution in value can be shown
only if the fair market value of the property prior to the imposition of
the challenged regulation is based upon a potential use of the property
as the highest and best use. It is also quite common, however, that
such a highest and best use is not allowed as of right, but that one or
more federal, state, and local permits are necessary. To establish the
ready convertability of the property to the purported highest and best
use, the property owner must show that there is a sufficient likelihood
that the necessary approvals will be received.179 To do so, the prop-
erty owner must submit evidence showing that all of the permit crite-
174. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF
REAL ESTATE 19, 269 (9th ed. 1987).
175. Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 335, citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 153, 156 (1990). See also United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943);
National Bank of N. Am. v. Systems Home Improvement, Inc., 419 N.Y.S.2d 606
(App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 407 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1980).
176. National Bank, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 610. See also Rosen v. State of New York, 301
N.Y.S.2d 353 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1969).
177. National Bank, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 606-10; Rosen, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 357-60.
178. In re Town of Islip v. Mascioli, 411 N.Y.S.2d 645 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 402
N.E.2d 1123 (N.Y. 1980). See also Berwick v. State, 486 N.Y.S.2d 260 (App. Div.
1985); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. New York, 479 N.Y.S.2d 983, 988 (App. Div.
1984).
179. Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 336-37 (defendant contended that plaintiff would have
needed state and local permits, and thus its action as the federal government was not
a taking; court found such contention to be without merit since state agency had no
jurisdiction over site and local authorities enthusiastically supported development).
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ria can be satisfied or that a variance is sufficiently likely for any
permit criteria that cannot be satisfied.180 Attempting to prove these
facts often requires complex environmental and technical evidence
tantamount to what would be required for an actual permit
application.18 1
In a further attempt to increase the value of property just prior to
the alleged taking, a property owner may attempt to equate the value
of property at its highest and best use with the profits that purportedly
would have been generated from that potential use of property. How-
ever, proving value from potential profits of a hypothetical business
has been rejected by the courts. In Levitin v. State of New York,"8 a
valuation of property based upon forecasts of income from a nonexis-
tent business was rejected for eminent domain purposes. In Levitin,
the claimant alleged that the highest and best use of certain con-
demned property would be as an extension of an existing motel onto
another portion of the property that was vacant.' 83 Although the
court accepted the highest and best use, it rejected equating the value
of the property with the discounted profits for the theoretically ex-
panded business:
Such a method of evaluation of vacant, unimproved land is com-
pletely unprecedented. There is no authority cited by claimants in
support of it and none is to be found, for how can income be capital-
ized to produce a residual land value when the appropriated land is
neither producing income nor equipped to produce such income?
The fact that part of the entire parcel was producing income be-
cause of a business operated thereon is of no moment even if it be
accepted that the highest and best use of the appropriated part
would have been an extension of that business... [A] claim based
upon a conclusion conjectured from data founded only in specula-
tion [can] not be countenanced.
This is not to say that prospective use of highest and best use and
its influence on a prospective purchaser may not be an influence in
the determination of market value. But a claim is improper where it
is based entirelyon hypothetical profits estimated from a nonexistent
business .... 1
180. Id.
181. Id. at 337.
182. 207 N.Y.S.2d 798 (App. Div. 1960).
183. Id. at 799 (claimants put in claim for $530,000 based on "projected" capitaliza-
tion of hypothetical revenue stream).
184. Id. at 800 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also City of New York v.
Chestnut Properties Co., 332 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (App. Div. 1972), aff'd, 316 N.E.2d 328
(N.Y. 1974) (land cannot be valued based upon "[e]laborate forecasts of income from
non-existing structures on land which need large physical change to be usable .. .
Id.
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Similarly, it is a long-standing rule of federal takings law that loss of
future profits is a "slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim."1 5
Rather, the proper method of valuation is to determine the amount
that a willing buyer and seller would set as the price for the property
in an arm's length transaction.'8
While the fair market value of property before and after the imposi-
tion of the challenged regulation is to be measured at the highest and
best use of the property, the highest and best use may be for the entire
property or for less than the entire property if such a focus is appro-
priate under the "whole parcel" analysis. If the difference between
the fair market value of the property before and after the imposition
of the regulation is such that all or virtually all of the property's value
has been destroyed, then a categorical taking has occurred. In most
cases, however, such a gross disparity in value will not exist and the
courts will rely upon other tests to determine whether a taking has
occurred. One such test is whether the property owner can obtain a
reasonable economic return from any permitted use of the property.
In addition, as discussed in the following section, the courts will also
balance the interests of the government in enacting and applying the
regulation against the property owner's interest in the free use of
property.
C. Balancing of Benefits and Burdens
Long before the decision in Penn Central, the Supreme Court relied
upon a balancing of benefits and burdens in determining whether a
land-use regulation caused a taking of property. In Euclid, the
Supreme Court noted that the significant loss in value caused by zon-
ing of property was not something isolated to the property owner.
Rather, the benefits and burdens of the zoning ordinance-which had
already been held to be a legitimate exercise of the police power-
were spread among all of the property owners of the municipality.18 7
The notion that a diminution in value is more acceptable if spread
generally across the population was one of the pillars upon which Eu-
clid was based. A half century later, the same issue was the crux of
the difference between the majority and the dissent in Penn Central.
The majority saw the New York City Landmarks Law as merely an-
185. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Park Avenue Tower Associates v.
City of New York, 746 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985);
Sadowsky v. New York, 732 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1984); Elias v. Town of Brookhaven, 783
F. Supp. 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
186. In re Huie, 152 N.Y.S.2d 95 (App. Div. 1956). See also Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at
340 (plaintiff received offers from conservationists for his property, but such offers
were discounted by court since they were in amounts far less than value prior to gov-
ernment action and were not the product of negotiations between a willing buyer and
a willing seller under no duress) (citations omitted).
187. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 392, 393-94 (1926).
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other land-use restriction that applies generally throughout the city."s
The dissent focused on the fact that only approximately 400 property
owners were burdened by the Landmarks Law. 89 The dissenters
noted that these property owners bore a substantially disproportion-
ate share of the burdens of the Landmarks Law while the community
generally enjoyed the benefits. 190
Most recently, in Lucas, the same issue reappeared. There, Justice
Scalia noted that the extraordinary impact of the beachfront protec-
tion regulations upon Lucas required him to "sacrifice all beneficial
uses in the name of the common good." 191 Similarly, in Florida Rock
!V,192 the Court noted that one of the critical factors in the ad hoc
analysis, from Village of Euclid through Penn Central, is the extent to
which land-use regulation rests disproportionately on one or a few
property owners, as opposed to a general public program to adjust the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.19
3
Since the Penn Central factors result in an inquiry that the Supreme
Court characterized as ad hoc,194 and since Lucas supplies no signifi-
cant refinement or expansion of the Penn Central test in the context of
non-categorical takings, the state and lower federal courts have been
on their own in interpreting and applying the "fairness" balancing test
in the situations in which a very large percentage, but not all, of the
value of property is destroyed by government regulation. 95 In so do-
ing, these courts have attempted to give meaning to the broad inter-
ests that must be balanced.
In Florida Rock I, the trial court noted that the severity of the loss
of economic use suffered by the property owner was of great impor-
tance in determining whether a taking has occurred. 196 However, in
Florida Rock IV, the appellate court stated that it and the trial court
were bound to consider whether there were any "direct compensating
benefits accruing to the property, and others similarly situated, flow-
ing from the regulatory environment? Or are benefits, if any, general
and widely shared through the community and the society, while the
costs are focused on a few?"' 9 7
188. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
189. Id. at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J.; dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2866, 2895 (1992).
192. 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
193. Id. at 1570.
194. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), cited in Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d 1560,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
195. Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1569.
196. Florida Rock 1, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 166 (1985) ("In cases involving regulatory tak-
ings, the court must examine the substance, rather than the legal trappings, of what is
left as a result of the government's regulatory action. If that which is left to the prop-
erty owner is rendered meaningless by that which is taken compensation is due.").
197. Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1571.
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In Florida Rock IV, the court acknowledged that this analysis must
still account for the fact that government must be able to diminish
property rights to some extent or government could hardly go on.198
Ultimately, the court remanded for further fact finding, particularly
on the "before" and "after" value of the property.' 99 Despite its re-
peated pronouncement on the nature of the fact-finding process, it
appears that the Federal Circuit's directives are not so easy to
apply.200
Other courts have had similar difficulty in formulating guidelines
for the trial courts' fact-finding process. For example, in remanding
for further proceedings under the ad hoc Penn Central test, the Elev-
enth Circuit20' developed a comprehensive list of factors to be
weighed and considered by the trial court:
(1) the history of the property-when was it purchased? How much
land was purchased? Where was the land located? What was the
nature of the title? What was the composition of the land and how
was it initially used?; (2) the history of development-what was
built on the property and by whom? How was it subdivided and to
whom was it sold? What plats were filed? What roads were dedi-
cated?; (3) the history of zoning and regulation-how and when
was the land classified? How was use proscribed? What changes in
classifications occurred?; (4) how did development change when ti-
tle passed?; (5) what is the present nature and extent of the prop-
erty?; (6) what were the reasonable expectations of the landowner
under state common law?; (7) what were the reasonable expecta-
tions of the neighboring landowners under state common law?; and
(8) perhaps, most importantly, what was the diminution in the in-
vestment-backed expectations of the landowner, if any, after pas-
sage of the regulation?202
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,203 the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed some of the key elements of the Florida Rock decision it
handed down months earlier. For example, it noted that:
A property owner who can establish that a regulatory taking of
property has occurred is entitled to a monetary recovery for the
198. Id.
199. What is notable about Florida Rock IV is that the courtapplied the economic
analysis utilized in physical takings to the regulatory context. In physical takings,
even relatively minor invasions are compensable and the amount paid is equal to the
estate taken. The Florida Rock IV court saw no reason to distinguish regulatory from
physical takings and held that the amount of just compensation should be propor-
tional to the interest taken as compared to the total value of the property. Id. at 1569.
200. For example, the appellate opinion in Florida Rock II was implemented in
Florida Rock III, but resulted in the reversal reported in Florida Rock IV.
201. Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 131
L.Ed.2d 557 (1995).
202. Id. at 1136.
203. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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value of the interest taken, measured by what is just
compensation. 2 4
Thus, Loveladies reaffirmed the Florida Rock holding that compen-
sation would relate to the value of the interest taken, which could be
less than the full fee interest. Loveladies also posited yet another
three-part test, ostensibly derived from Lucas, but which supposedly
eliminates much of the vague balancing inherent in the Penn Central
test:
With regard to the interest alleged to be taken, there has been a
regulatory taking if: (1) there was a denial of economically viable
use of the property as a result of the regulatory imposition; (2) the
property owner had distinct investment-backed expectations; and
(3) it was an interest vested in the owner, as a matter of state prop-
erty law, and not within the power of the state to regulate under
common law nuisance doctrine.2 °5
However, Loveladies contains little direction concerning how this
test is to be applied. Most of the economic analysis in Loveladies fo-
cuses on the "whole parcel" issue, as discussed above.20 6
Until further refined by the courts, it appears that the balancing test
most typically contemplated in regulatory takings cases involves the
extent to which burdens of a regulation are unfairly isolated upon one
or a few property owners and benefits are spread across society gener-
ally. In this balancing scenario, however, it is easier to see how the
burdens are placed on a single property owner because that property
owner is before the court. It is far more difficult to show that all or
many property owners are similarly burdened. Indeed, in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,2°7 the existence of such reciprocal bene-
fits and burdens appeared to be accepted by the Court from the na-
ture of the regulatory system (comprehensive zoning) and not from
any empirical data.
In that regard, most localities have adopted a variety of different
environmental and land-use regulations that together form a regula-
tory matrix that burdens all or virtually all property. One particular
element of that system may burden a particular property more se-
verely, but the entire system generally applies reciprocally to all prop-
erty. Thus, some properties may be burdened by wetlands
restrictions, others by limitations on development of steeply sloped
land or on ridgelines, but all property is regulated for the overall pro-
tection of the public health, safety, and welfare. The salutary effect of
such regulations and their ability to enhance the value of property-
204. Id. at 1179.
205. Id
206. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
207. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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particularly individual homes-should not be overlooked in the tak-
ings arena.
CONCLUSION
The law of regulatory takings is clearly in a rapid state of develop-
ment. Balancing the interests of private property owners and the pub-
lic is proving to be both extremely difficult and critically important. It
is evident, however, from the repeated remands in Florida Rock and
Loveladies, that the Supreme Court has not established guidelines for
the typical takings case. Indeed, the most recent Florida Rock deci-
sion, with its lengthy dissent, reveals a fundamental disagreement in
the Federal Circuit between the teachings of Lucas and other cases in
which less than all economically viable use of property is destroyed.
Against this background of uncertainty, local governments still must
regulate and property owners will still seek to develop. In the middle,
litigators will wage a battle of appraisers and expert witnesses. In this
battle, the following considerations will continue to guide the resolu-
tion of non-categorical takings cases until the Supreme Court speaks
again: (1) what is the appropriate "parcel" for purposes of the takings
claim; (2) what was the fair market value of the property before and
after the alleged taking, given its highest and best use; (3) could the
property have provided a reasonable economic return from any of its
permissible uses; (4) could the property have been sold, as is, for a
reasonable economic return; (5) has the application of the regulation
interfered with the property owner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations; and (6) do the burdens imposed by the regulation un-
fairly single out the property owner and confer benefits to society
generally?
In our complex world, the notion of "free use of property" as it
existed in the formative years of our nation is no longer viable. Gone
is the time when land could be exploited and discarded, with more
readily available by expanding the frontier.
Our need for safe drinking water and a healthy environment and
our ingrained belief in the sanctity of private property cause conflicts
that are not amenable to easy resolutions. While some elements of
takings law are becoming clearer, there is far more litigation on the
horizon.
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